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commentary

Torture and the Professions
DAVID LUBAN
Last year, Cambridge University Press
published a book titled The Torture Debate In America.1 In my opinion, it’s a
shocking title. Ten years ago, a puzzled
reader would have asked “What torture debate in America? There’s no
torture debate!” After all, torture is a
serious federal crime. U.S. courts had
denounced the “dastardly and totally
inhuman” practice of torture,2 and the
U.S. government condemns torture in
the benighted countries that practice it.
 As they say: There was before 9/11
and after 9/11. Now, we take it for
granted that there is a torture debate in
America.
Indeed, I would like to suggest that
there are two torture debates in America. One, waged in the popular press
and in TV melodramas like 24, is an
entirely fictitious debate about whether
you should torture terrorists to find the
ticking time bomb. This debate is fictitious, because it assumes, or stipulates,
a wildly improbable set of facts: that
we know there is a ticking time bomb,
that we know the time is short, that we
know we have the right person, that we
know he knows where the bomb is, that
we know he won’t talk under humane
interrogation, and that we have good
reason to believe that he will talk under
torture, rather than lying or holding out
until the bomb goes off—or passing out
or dying. We also know that the torturer
is not a sadist or a brute, and that this
case is an exception to an anti-torture
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rule that the interrogator, who is no sadist or psychopath, basically accepts. All
these assumptions are, of course, deeply
questionable.3
Unfortunately, everyone who talks
about torture talks about ticking bombs,
as if once we’ve settled our moral intuitions in this singular case, we’ve settled
everything there is to settle. In fact, the
ticking bomb scenario settles almost
nothing, because it has almost nothing
to do with reality. The case is, quite simply, an intellectual fraud.
Last November, General Patrick Finnegan, the dean of West Point, flew to
Los Angeles together with two experienced interrogators, to plead with 24’s
script-writers to get rid of all those scenes
where the American hero, Jack Bauer,
stops the ticking bomb by torturing the
terrorist. Not only did General Finnegan
protest that these scenes falsify reality—where the tough stuff tends to fail
and rapport-building succeeds—he also
complained that the show’s popularity
among soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan
has created a monstrous “life imitates
art” problem: the soldiers are ignoring
their own training in order to become
torturers like Jack Bauer.
 The meeting was a failure. Understandably, the writers don’t want to
abandon the formula of their highly
successful show. And Joel Surnow, 24’s
executive producer and a self-described
“right-wing nut job” with connections
to high Bush administration officials, refused to attend the meeting.4
General Finnegan’s fear is that the
phony debate about ticking time bombs
will erode military discipline and contribute to a torture culture within the
U.S. military. That problem should be
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the real focus of the torture debate. It
is not about rare exceptions and existential choices made by heroic secret
agents flying solo. It is about practices,
attitudes, and protocols regarding how
to interrogate detainees who may know
something of interest or may not—and
who may be the right person or may not.
And, I might add, who may give more
and better information under humane
interrogation than they will through
brutality and humiliation.
 An additional worry is that a torture culture—bad enough on its own
terms—inevitably escalates and overflows its boundaries. Abu Ghraib is the
most famous American example, but it
is by no means the only one. We also
have cases like the death of Manadel Jamadi, roughed up by Navy SEALS and
the CIA, then hung by his arms behind
his back until he died; and Iraqi General
Abed Hamed Mowhoush, smothered to
death in a sleeping bag by an over-zealous interrogator who said he was trying to induce claustrophobia; and two
young Afghans, Dilawar and Habibullah, killed under torture by U.S. servicemen five years ago in a Bagram prison;
and Abdul Wali, an Afghan farmer beaten to death with a flashlight by contract
interrogator David Passaro. These are
by no means the only cases, but they are
the best-known, and I single them out
because nobody in the U.S. government
denies they took place.
 To talk about practices and protocols
of torture is to talk about a professional
culture of torture. That culture requires
the help of doctors, lawyers, and psycontinued on
page 58
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chologists; and that is why, today, I
want to talk about torture and the professions. However, the law frames the
debate about interrogation methods,
and before going any further, I need to
sketch out the legal background and the
dramatic story that follows from it.
 Two pieces of law are particularly relevant. The first is a world-wide treaty,
the Convention Against Torture, approved by 140 member states. It defines
torture as the intentional infliction of
severe physical or mental pain or suffering, and it requires states to criminalize torture. The U.S. has belonged to the
Torture Convention for twenty years,
and in line with the treaty, Congress
made torture a serious federal felony
that can carry the death penalty.
 The Torture Convention also requires
states to “undertake to prevent” cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment that
falls short of torture—so-called CID.5
Unlike torture, the treaty does not require parties to make CID a crime, only
to undertake to prevent it; and it isn’t a
crime under U.S. law. It is illegal, though:
in 2005, over strong Bush administration
objections, Congress passed the McCain
Amendment, which bans the government from using CID anywhere in the
world.
So, the first distinction to remember:
torture is a crime; CID is not a crime, but
it is illegal.
 The second important piece of the
legal framework is the Geneva Conventions, which forbid not only torture
and cruel treatment, but also “outrages
against personal dignity” including humiliating and degrading treatment.6 Geneva is a treaty, and under our Constitution, treaties are “supreme law of the
land.” The United States ratified Geneva
in 1955, and in the mid-1990s Congress
passed a war crimes statute that made
all grave Geneva violations serious federal crimes.7
Probably everyone reading this essay knows that in early 2002 President
Bush declared that the Geneva Conventions don’t apply to Al Qaeda or Taliban
captives. However, the Hamdan decision
(2006) by the Supreme Court reversed
the administration on this issue, and
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found that basic Geneva protections
apply to captives of both groups.8 That
meant that U.S. interrogation practices,
which heavily featured humiliating and
degrading treatment, were now officially war crimes—not just under international law, but under U.S. criminal law
as well.
 The Hamdan decision threw U.S. government lawyers into a frenzied effort
to formulate a legislative response. The
crucial moment came at the end of the
summer of 2006. In a dramatic press
conference, President Bush confirmed
that the CIA had secret prisons in foreign
countries. He also confirmed that some
detainees had been interrogated using
what he delicately called “an alternative
set of procedures.” The president would
not say what the alternative procedures
were, but he described them as “tough,
safe, [and] lawful. . . .”9 A week later, in
a press conference, he posed a question
in the starkest terms: “Do you want the
program to go forward or not?”10
 The program. What is “the program”?
What are these “tough, safe, lawful” alternative procedures?

The Hamdan decision threw
U.S. government lawyers into a
frenzied effort to formulate a
legislative response.

 The previous November, persons
within the CIA who leaked information
had given us part of the answer.11 They
detailed six techniques used on high-value Al Qaeda detainees. Let me mention
the three most drastic: Cold Cell, Long
Time Standing, and Waterboarding.
In Cold Cell, the detainee is stripped
naked, placed in a cell at fifty degrees,
and kept wet. Long Time Standing
means forcing the detainee to stand for
up to forty hours, chained to an eyebolt in the floor. And Waterboarding is
a method of inducing the panic-sensation of drowning by tying the detainee
down, placing cellophane or a wet cloth
over his nose and mouth, and pouring
water over it. It’s an old idea, called
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the “ducking stool” when it was used
against accused witches at Salem, and
“El Submarino” by secret police in Latin
American dirty wars.
Furthermore, we know about “the
program”from the U.S. Army’s own report about other cruel and humiliating
tactics used at Guantánamo Bay, many
in the interrogation of Mohammed Al
Qahtani. These included 160 days of
isolation. They included intensive sleep
deprivation—18- to 20-hour daily interrogations for 48 out of 54 days, interrupted only when Qahtani’s heart-rate
plunged catastrophically.12 They included humiliation tactics, including four
that migrated to Iraq and reappeared in
the horrifying Abu Ghraib photographs:
threatening him with growling, barking dogs; placing women’s underwear
on his head to humiliate him; stripping
him naked in front of U.S. women; and
leading him around on a dog leash and
making him do dog tricks. Qahtani was
also shot up with intravenous solution
and made to urinate on himself.13
 Other tactics that the Army report
admits included bombarding detainees
with high-volume rock and rap music
—what the Army called “futility music.”—and threatening to have one detainee’s mother arrested and shipped to
Guantánamo .
 There were other sexual humiliations
as well: dressing Qahtani in a bra, taunting him as a homosexual, and having a
female interrogator straddle him while
she described the deaths of fellow Al
Qaeda members. FBI agents also described surreal scenes in which Arab
prisoners were strapped in chairs and
forced to watch gay porn while strobe
lights flashed in their faces.14
 That is “the program.”
Following the press conference, after weeks of pressure from the White
House, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006. The
act gave the president what he wants.
Remember that Hamdan made it clear
that humiliation tactics are war crimes
under U.S. law. The MCA responded in
the most direct possible way: it decriminalized them, retroactively, all the way
back to 1997. They are still illegal, but
they are no longer crimes, and indeed
there is no sanction for violating them.
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 Torture, remember, means intentionally inflicting severe physical or mental
pain or suffering. These are commonsense descriptive terms, not arcane
lawyer’s words; and common sense
says that some of the techniques I’ve described are plain torture. Consider the
tactic of Long Time Standing. Decades
ago, Cornell University researchers studied Long Time Standing because it was
a tactic that the KGB used. They found
that standing for eighteen hours or more
makes fluid move down into the ankles.
The ankles double in size. Excruciating
joint pain sets in. Blisters erupt and ooze
watery serum. Heartbeats race, as the
heart tries to keep blood pumping up to
the brain. Kidneys fail; and victims begin to experience delusions.15
Waterboarding, too, is torture. CIA
agents who subjected themselves to it
broke after fifteen seconds, and interrogators were reportedly filled with admiration at Al Qaeda leader Khalid Sheik
Mohammed for lasting more than two
minutes.16 If you want to know how Waterboarding feels, try blowing all the air
out of your lungs and then holding your
breath for two minutes. (Just—please!—
don’t do it now.)
 Other techniques obviously aren’t
torture. Presumably it is not torture to
be dressed in a bra. But there is little
doubt that the many forms of sexual
humiliation that U.S. forces inflict on
detainees—and I’ve described only the
best-documented of them—count as
“humiliating and degrading treatment,”
“outrages on personal dignity.” Even if
these are no longer crimes, they remain
illegal. More fundamentally, they are
immoral. Jack Bauer doesn’t do them,
presumably because, unlike physical
violence, they might upset a television
audience. But they are part of “the program.”
 All of this serves by way of background to my main topic today—the
role of the professions in the nasty little
torture culture constructed at Guantánamo, at Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca,
at Abu Ghraib, and at secret CIA prisons like “Hotel California,” so named
because you can check in but you can’t
check out again. I’m going to discuss
three professional examples, lawyers,
psychologists, and anthropologists, and
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mention a fourth, physicians—before
turning to more general ethical questions about professionals dancing with
the devil.

Lawyers
The most famous examples are the lawyers. A few weeks after the Abu Ghraib
revelations in 2004, the Wall Street Journal published a secret “torture memo”
written by Justice Department lawyers
in 2002. It was soon followed by literally
thousands of pages of documents, some
leaked, some public, that made it clear
that the road to Abu Ghraib had been
paved with legal opinions. Carefully
and methodically, the torture lawyers
disconnected the brakes on harsh interrogations.
 The famous torture memo provided
maximum impunity for interrogators. It
concluded that inflicting physical pain
doesn’t count as torture unless the interrogator specifically intended the pain
to reach the level associated with organ
failure or death; that inflicting mental
suffering is lawful unless the interrogator intends it to last for months or years
after the interrogation; that enforcing
criminal laws against torturers is unconstitutional if the president authorizes the
torture; that lawful self-defense includes
torturing helpless detainees in the name
of national self-defense; and that torture
can be justified as the lesser evil through
the legal defense of necessity.
 The memo’s legal arguments were
widely regarded as preposterous. It defined torture by lifting language from a
Medicare statute on medical emergencies. It ignored inconvenient Supreme
Court precedents, flatly misrepresented
what sources said, and at one point argued that while torture might be justified as a lesser evil, the same needn’t be
true of life-saving abortions.
 Eventually the Justice Department
withdrew the torture memo and replaced it with a more presentable one.
In my view, though, the changes were
merely cosmetic—and, in fact, the substitute memo states in a footnote that
all tactics approved under the previous
memo are still approved.17 Furthermore,
in October 2007 the New York Times reported that as late as 2005 the Justice
Department produced two new torture
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memos—one to approve “the harshest
interrogation tactics ever used by the
CIA,” the other to approve cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.18
It would take too much time to go
through all the important torture opinions written by government lawyers.
But I do want to mention one other, because it figures importantly in my next
case-study, the psychologists. This is an
opinion from April 2005 interpreting the
legal meaning of CID—cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment that falls short
of torture. Unlike the torture memo, it
is not well-known. It appears in a letter from the Justice Department to three
senators who had questioned U.S. interrogation policy; and it was meant to
flesh out testimony from Alberto Gonzales at his confirmation hearing. It was
signed by Assistant Attorney General
William E. Moschella, and I’ll call it the
“Moschella opinion.”19 The Moschella
opinion correctly points out that when
the U.S. ratified the Torture Convention,
the Senate attached an understanding
saying that the term “CID” means the
kind of cruel treatment forbidden by the
U.S. Constitution. This, in the Supreme
Court’s famous formula for unconstitutional cruelty, is treatment that “shocks
the conscience.”20
 According to the Moschella opinion,
this category includes “‘only the most
egregious conduct,’ such as ‘conduct
intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest.’”21 Of
course, if this were really the test, then
no form of abuse or mistreatment would
shock the conscience if it is intended to
help national security. On the Moschella
test, nothing in “the program” could
ever shock the conscience, and therefore nothing in the program could ever
count as CID treatment banned by the
Torture Convention and the McCain
Amendment.
 Can that be right? The answer is emphatically no. To be sure, the “unjustifiable by any government interest”
language that Moschella quoted comes
directly from a Supreme Court opinion.
But—characteristically of the torture
memos—the Moschella opinion cleverly leaves off the rest of the sentence to
distort its meaning. The full sentence in
the Supreme Court’s opinion says that
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injurious conduct unjustifiable by any
government interest “is the sort of conduct most likely to rise to the conscienceshocking level.”22 That seems true—but
of course, it in no way suggests that
other conduct doesn’t equally shock the
conscience.
In fact, the Court held exactly the opposite of what the Moschella opinion
says in Rochin, the case that first introduced the “shocks the conscience” formula into U.S. jurisprudence. In that
decision, the Court found that it unconstitutionally shocks the conscience for
police to pump a suspect’s stomach to
retrieve narcotics evidence, even though
retrieving evidence obviously is a justifiable government interest. The Moschella opinion conveniently fails to mention
this decision, just as it conveniently cuts
off the Supreme Court’s statement halfway through to change its meaning.
I’ve argued in several places that writing legal opinions like these is unethical.23 They are what lawyers call “Cover
Your Ass” (CYA) opinions, designed to
reassure clients that the lawyers have
exonerated in advance whatever they
might do. In this respect, they are no different from opinion letters that large law
firms write for corporate clients like Enron, saying that their financial shenanigans are proper and legitimating them
in advance.
 Of course, in their role as advocates
lawyers are always supposed to argue
the construction of the law most favorable to what the client wants, relying on
the adversary to argue differently. What
makes CYA opinions unethical by professional standards is that lawyers advising clients don’t have an adversary
and are not supposed to be advocates.
Their duty, under the profession’s ethics codes, is to provide clients with “independent” and “candid” advice about
what the law requires, not advice spun
to say whatever the clients want to
hear.24 Lawyers who write “Cover Your
Ass” memos are neither independent
nor candid. They are not advocates or
advisors, but rather indulgence sellers.
Indulgence-selling is not a role that
the profession recognizes, and it is not
a role that the profession ought to recognize. The legal advisor is supposed to be
a check on client illegality, not a facilita-
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tor of it. The ABA’s Model Rules justify
confidentiality by postulating that when
clients confidentially ask lawyers for
legal opinions, lawyers usually try to
dissuade their clients from wrongdoing.
If what really goes on is that the client
tells the lawyer, “Write me an opinion
that says I can do what I want to do,”
and the lawyer obliges, then the ABA’s
argument collapses and confidentiality
ought to be abolished.
 Of course, there’s an even more basic
reason for criticizing the torture lawyers. It’s one thing for lawyers to loophole the law on behalf of clients’ financial shenanigans or tax “avoision.” It’s
quite another to loophole the law on
behalf of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. As Jeremy Waldron has
powerfully argued, the content of laws
matters: laws protecting basic human
rights should be interpreted by looking
at their spirit and purpose, not by kabbalistic formal manipulations of their
letter to give the client wiggle-room for
torture.25
When we turn from the Justice Department’s lawyers to the American Bar
Association, however, matters are quite
different. The ABA has produced a series of reports condemning the abuse of
detainees and their lack of legal process.
And, in a notable gesture, in the fall of
2007 the ABA’s president refused a government request to help locate pro bono
lawyers to represent Guantánamo detainees, because the legal process available to detainees is too unfair for the
ABA to support.26

Psychiatrists and Psychologists
I turn next to the psychologists. Their
role in the interrogation process is interesting and complex. For decades, the
CIA has studied psychological manipulation as an interrogation tool. The military uses the science of psychology for
similar purposes, but also to study how
U.S. service personnel can be immunized against brainwashing if they are
captured. This is the so-called “SERE”
program—an abbreviation for Survival,
Evasion, Resistance, Escape. A couple of
years ago, The New Yorker’s Jane Mayer
revealed that Guantánamo interrogators
are accompanied by Behavioral Science
Consultation Teams—the acronym is
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“Biscuits.”27 Biscuits try to reverse-engineer the SERE findings, coaching interrogators in how best to manipulate
captives to break them.28 Some of the
SERE techniques are among the torture
and CID techniques I described earlier,
including Waterboarding.29
But even apart from torture techniques, the Biscuits determine what kind
of deprivations will work with uncooperative detainees, and what kind of rewards will reinforce cooperative behavior. “According to a former interrogator
. . . , behavioral scientists control the
most minute details of interrogations, to
the point of decreeing, in the case of one
detainee, that he would be given seven
squares of toilet paper per day.”30
 Arguably, there’s nothing unethical
about psychologists offering general advice about how to manipulate detainees
into talking. After all, manipulation is
the humane alternative to torture and
cruelty. (I note, however, that many psychologists disagree, because they believe
that participating in any way at all in a
setting like Guantánamo is unethical.)
 The third-rail issue for Biscuits lies in
determining when to use so-called Ego
Down and Futility tactics—interrogators’ shorthand for attempts to humiliate detainees or drive them to despair, in
order to get them to open up. Obviously,
psychologists who devise Ego Down
protocols are treading on the territory of
“humiliating and degrading” treatment
forbidden by the Geneva Conventions.
But I think troubling ethical problems can arise even from treatment
that comes nowhere near CID or torture. I recently asked a U.S. interrogator
who had worked in Iraq and Afghanistan about the Biscuits in his unit. His
surprising answer was that a Biscuit
taught him how to induce Stockholm
Syndrome in detainees. It’s easy to do,
he explained, and remarkably effective.
Detainees have all the time in the world
on their hands. Their only human contact is their interrogator, and—oddly
enough—that makes the interrogation
sessions the high point of the detainee’s
day. To induce Stockholm Syndrome,
the interrogator simply expresses a lot
of interest in the detainee, chats him up,
brings him small gifts, gives him news
of the outside world—and asks ques-
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tions. If the detainee answers the questions, the conversation continues. If the
detainee won’t answer questions, the
interrogator simply leaves, and the high
point of the day is gone for another day.
In a remarkably short time, the detainee
bonds with the interrogator the way a
dog bonds with its master.
 Clearly, this doesn’t come within
miles of cruel or humiliating treatment.
It’s just the opposite. Nevertheless,
the interrogator who told me about it
had deep misgivings about what he
had done. In his words, “I had a moral
problem about doing to him what the
Symbionese Liberation Army did to
Patty Hearst.” To my astonishment, he
brought up Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor and Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at
Noon—two texts that are remarkably to
the point. This was, I might add, a young
man in his early twenties, just out of the
Army, beginning his freshman year in
college. He is intelligent and thoughtful,
and obviously he has read widely about
his profession.

Seeming to take a principled
position, it appears that the
psychiatrists may have
adopted a resolution with
disabling loopholes.
In Stockholm Syndrome, kidnap victims identify emotionally with their
captors and come over to the captors’
values. When the captors are criminals,
or political sects like the Symbionese
Liberation Army, we can recognize how
grotesque and pathological that is. But
what if the prisoner is a suicide bomber
and his captors’ values are liberal-democratic? What if we think the captors’
values are the right values? That has to
count for something. But the fact that the
prisoner acquires those values as a result
of a pathology-inducing manipulation
counts for something too. The young interrogator I spoke with decided that the
balance favors the manipulation—and,
on the whole, given the incredible violence in Iraq, I think he was right. But he
also worried about the Grand Inquisitor,
and that is right too.
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I couldn’t help but wonder whether
the Biscuit thought about Dostoevsky
and Koestler. I wonder whether the Biscuit thought at all about the morality of
teaching interrogators how to induce
psychopathology in prisoners. And I
wonder whether the Biscuit would have
greater qualms recommending sexual
humiliations and torture.
In May 2006, the American Psychiatric Association adopted a resolution that
forbids psychiatrists from participating
in interrogations, either directly or indirectly,31 and in June 2006 the American
Medical Association reached the same
conclusion for physicians.32 There was
debate among the psychiatrists about
whether they could participate in noncoercive interrogations, but—according
to Dr. Samuel Sharfstein, the American
Psychiatric Association’s president, in
a letter to the British Medical Journal—a
large majority thought that facilities like
Guantánamo are “inherently coercive.”33
They rejected the Pentagon’s argument
“that doctors advising interrogators
were ‘behavioral scientists’ exempt from
‘ethics strictures.’”34
 That is hardly the end of the matter,
however. The resolution does permit
psychiatrists to “provide training to
military or civilian investigative or law
enforcement personnel . . . on the possible medical or psychological effects of
particular techniques and conditions of
interrogation.” That seems like a loophole in the resolution. Moreover, the
view that Guantánamo is inherently coercive is not reflected in the text of the
resolution itself; it is merely the reported
view of most members of the Association. Furthermore, Dr. Sharfstein further
diluted the message in an interview by
“noting the position statement is not ‘an
ethical rule.’” He added that “individual psychiatrists wouldn’t get in trouble
with the APA” for failing to follow the
guidelines, and, “If they’re given an
Army order, that would be another
question.”35 As the philosopher J. L.
Austin once wrote, there’s the bit where
you say it and the bit where you take it
back. Seeming to take a principled position, it appears that the psychiatrists
may have adopted a resolution with
disabling loopholes.
 Matters are even more controversial,
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though, in the case of the American
Psychological Association (APA), the
leading professional association of psychologists, with 150,000 members. APA
members have a “long involvement in
military research and CIA behavioral
experiments.”36 Over many years, tens
of millions of government dollars have
supported psychologists’ research into
interrogation methods, some of them
profoundly threatening to sanity. For
example, Jose Padilla, isolated in a military brig and interrogated for years before his criminal trial and conviction,
now has the personality of—to quote
the brig staff—a “piece of furniture.”37
The techniques of intense isolation that
deranged Padilla come straight from
the Kubark Manual, a notorious CIA
summary of decades of psychological
research.
Debate about whether the American
Psychological Association should forbid
psychologists from participating in interrogations arose after reports surfaced
of mental health professionals assisting
in breaking down detainees. The debate
occurred in three phases. First, in 2005
the APA created a small Psychological
Ethics and National Security (PENS)
taskforce, which issued a report in June
2005.38 Unlike the physicians’ and psychiatrists’ resolutions, this report did
not propose forbidding psychologist
participation in interrogations, so long
as the interrogations are humane.
 The report has subsequently proven
controversial, because one member of
the taskforce, Dr. Jean Maria Arrigo, has
gone public with serious criticisms of its
process—including the fact that six of
nine voting members had Defense Department ties or were actually involved
in Guantánamo interrogations. (In line
with these process criticisms, my own
colleague, Gregg Bloche—a lawyerpsychiatrist who has published highprofile exposés and critiques of medical
involvement at Guantánamo—reports
to me that he had been invited to meet
with the PENS taskforce, but was disinvited at the last minute when the New
York Times published an article about his
forthcoming research.39)
 The second phase of the controversy
occurred at the Association’s 2006 annual meeting. The Army’s Surgeon-
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General, Dr. Kevin Kiley, addressed the
group and argued that “psychology
is an important weapons system.” He
pleaded with the APA’s governing council not to adopt any specific definition of
abuse that psychologists are forbidden
from participating in. He asked, “Is four
hours of sleep deprivation [abuse]? How
loud does a scream have to be? How
many angels can dance on the head of
a pin?” The APA’s leadership initially
invited Kiley with no rebuttal speaker.
In the face of a hasty petition drive by
outraged members, a rebuttal speaker
was invited at the last minute, with little
time to prepare.40 The Association then
adopted a resolution about psychologists participating in torture or CID.41
 None of this controversy is apparent
from the APA’s resolution, which looks
like a forceful condemnation of psychologists participating in torture or CID. In
fact, its president, Sharon Brehm, wrote,
“The American Psychological Association’s . . . position on torture is clear and
unequivocal. Any direct or indirect participation in any act of torture or other
forms of cruel, degrading or inhuman
treatment by psychologists is strictly
prohibited. No exceptions!”42
However, the APA’s position was not
as clear and unequivocal as President
Brehm believed. For one thing, the APA’s
code of ethics permits members to obey
lawful authority such as military orders
even if doing so would violate the ethics
code. Secondly, unlike psychiatrists and
physicians, psychologists are permitted
to participate in interrogations, so long
as they don’t involve torture or CID.
 Most importantly, though, at the last
minute the APA added an innocuouslooking clause to its resolution about
torture—a clause that builds the technical legal definition of CID into the
resolution. This, remember, means that
conduct only counts as CID if it is unconstitutional, that is, “shocks the conscience.” Remember as well that the
Moschella opinion states that conduct
with a legitimate governmental purpose,
like national security, does not shock the
conscience. I’ve pointed out that this
badly misrepresents the law, but it is the
executive branch’s own misrepresentation, and it provided a gaping legal loophole for any psychologist to participate
in cruel or degrading interrogations.
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Furthermore, the Moschella opinion
eviscerates another protection that the
APA built into its anti-torture resolution. The resolution commits members
to respect the U.N.’s 1982 Principles of
Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of
Health Personnel, in the Protection of
Prisoners and Detainees against Torture
and CID. Among those principles is one
forbidding health personnel from applying “their knowledge and skills in
order to assist in the interrogation of
prisoners and detainees in a manner
that may adversely affect the physical
or mental health or condition of such
prisoners or detainees and which is not in
accordance with the relevant international
instruments.”43
 On its face, it sounds good. But if the
“relevant international instrument” is
the Torture Convention’s ban on CID
as interpreted by the Moschella opinion,
this fine-sounding principle imposes
no limit on what psychologists can do
in devising cruel, inhuman, or degrading methods in the service of national
security.

The APA’s code of ethics
permits members to obey lawful
authority such as military orders
even if doing so would violate
the ethics code.
 Many APA members protested the
2006 resolution, and this led to the third
phase of controversy: at its August 2007
convention, the organization adopted an
even stronger resolution.44 Here, again,
a military psychologist argued passionately that the organization should
permit psychologists to participate at
Guantánamo, dramatically asserting
that “If we lose psychologists from these
facilities, people are going to die.” (This
led the normally conservative Houston
Chronicle’s editorial writers to protest
that “any interrogation system that teeters so close to atrocities needs more
than a psychologist.”45)
 Nevertheless, the APA reaffirmed the
2006 resolution, but also strengthened
it significantly. The new APA resolution
lists almost twenty techniques—includ-
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ing all those that U.S. forces have reportedly used—and specifies that they
count as either torture or CID. That is
something that the U.S. government has
never admitted. And the resolution contains “an absolute prohibition against
psychologists’ knowingly planning, designing, and assisting in the use of torture and any form of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”46
 Even here, however, the APA left
loopholes. It once again uses the official
definition of CID, which means that if
the government devises harsh interrogation techniques other than those itemized in the resolution, the Moschella
opinion implies that psychologists may
participate in them. Furthermore, the
resolution hedges on whether isolation,
sensory deprivation or over-stimulation,
and sleep deprivation count as CID—according to the resolution, they do only if
“used in a manner that represents significant pain or suffering or in a manner
that a reasonable person would judge
to cause lasting harm,” which is in my
view a significant loophole. The resolution affirms the right of psychologists
to refuse to work in “settings in which
detainees are deprived of adequate protection of their human rights,” but it imposes no duty on them to refuse to work
in such settings.
 The APA remains bitterly divided,
with some high-profile resignations
over the interrogation issue, and a decision by three college psychology departments to disown the resolution. Psychologist Ken Pope’s non-partisan and
very valuable compilation of articles on
the controversy now includes almost
150 items.47
 The division among the psychologists
partly reflects the gap between those
who work for the Defense Department
and those who do not; but it also reflects
a long-standing difference in outlook
between clinicians, who favor the Hippocratic, patient-centered, do-no-harm
ethics of physicians and psychiatrists,
and researchers, who by and large have
a more neutral and technical outlook. By
that I mean that the research enterprise
focuses on acquisition of knowledge,
and it carries no built-in assumptions
about the purposes that knowledge can
be enlisted to serve. If the researcher
wants to study areas that advance hu-
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man well-being, that is a fine thing. But
if she wants to do research for its own
sake, that is just fine too. And if she is
hired by the CIA to help break down
captives—that is entirely her prerogative. She may be interested in the interrogation problem as a pure technical
challenge. Or she may think that placing her knowledge in service of the
War on Terror is her patriotic duty. Her
motive is irrelevant. Studying the human psyche is science, and in what I’m
calling the technical view, it carries no
built-in Hippocratic, health professional
assumptions.

Anthropologists
The same seems even clearer in the last
profession I want to discuss, anthropology. Anthropologists are first and foremost social scientists, and the research
enterprise doesn’t dictate how their
findings can be used. Because anthropologists study other cultures, anthropological knowledge can be very valuable to U.S. interrogators trying to pry
information out of detainees from Afghanistan, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia.
Some of this seems benign. For example, interrogators will need to know
the significance of kinship and clan relationships, culturally-specific gestures,
and practices of courtesy in order to
build rapport with captives and evaluate what they say and do.
But some of the knowledge can be
put to more sinister purposes. Seymour
Hersh reports that anthropologist Raphael Patai’s book The Arab Mind was
“the bible of neocons on Arab behavior.”48 It includes twenty-five pages on
why Arab men find sexual humiliation
and taunts about homosexuality peculiarly horrifying. Obviously, someone in
the government put this knowledge to
use and ordered sexual humiliation as
an interrogation tactic.
I’ve said that anthropologists are, first
and foremost, social scientists. That suggests that they may take the technical,
rather than the Hippocratic, view of
their profession. That’s not how anthropologists see it, though. For decades, the
profession has espoused a distinctive
moral stance toward human cultures: a
preference for tolerance, cultural preservation, and pluralist respect. Anthro-
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pologists believe in culture as a source
of value, perhaps the most important
source of value. In 1947, the American
Anthropological Association (AAA) issued a famous statement advocating a
culturally-relativist conception of human rights.49 (It drives moral philosophers nuts.) According to this view, the
right to one’s own culture is the most
central human right.
In 1999, the organization modified this
statement. It reiterated its commitment to
respect for cultural differences, but now
it argued that the organization’s commitment could best be honored “in practical
terms” through universal human rights,
rather than cultural relativism.50
Given either understanding, it should
come as no surprise that the idea of using anthropological knowledge to exploit the phobias of foreign cultures,
as part of an us-versus-them military
struggle to reconstruct their values,
seemed to many anthropologists to be
inconsistent with the very nature of
their profession. In 1970, the profession
had been roiled by charges and counter-charges about anthropologists participating in U.S. counter-insurgency
operations in Southeast Asia. This was
the so-called “Thailand controversy,”
which led to the resignation of several
members of the AAA’s ethics committee
and the adoption of a professional code
of ethics.51
So, in November 2006, the AAA business meeting adopted a resolution that
“unequivocally condemns the use of anthropological knowledge as an element
of physical and psychological torture,”
and went on to broadly condemn Bush
administration detainee and interrogation policies.52 The resolution passed
in June 2007.53 Furthermore, in October
2007 the AAA’s Executive Board issued
a statement condemning the military’s
so-called “Human Terrain System” project, which “places anthropologists, as
contractors with the U.S. military, in settings of war, for the purpose of collecting cultural and social data for use by
the U.S. military.” Among other things,
the Executive Board argues that in this
project anthropologists may be “used to
make decisions about identifying and
selecting specific populations as targets
of U.S. military operations either in the
short or long term.”54
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 Of course, there is a crucial difference
between an anthropologist contracting
with the government, and the government making its own use of published
anthropological studies. Only the former raises issues of professional ethics.
Furthermore, there is no denying that
the resolution was deeply political—a
way for a famously liberal professional
organization to Bush-bash. But in this
case, the political position also represents an attitude that most anthropologists regard as the basic norm of their
profession.

Professionalism and Torture
Those are my case studies: lawyers,
psychiatrists and psychologists, and anthropologists. Let’s step back now and
ask what we can say about the general
issue of professionals participating in
“the program” of abusive interrogation.
Remember that we are not talking about
ticking time-bomb cases. We are talking
about policies, protocols, and practices
to use on any suspected high-value captive, to pump him for anything he might
know that could conceivably help in the
War on Terror.
First, as a legal matter, persons in each
of these professions may have committed serious violations. Torture is a felony,
and so is conspiracy to torture and complicity in torture. Humiliating and degrading treatment isn’t a crime, because
Congress retroactively decriminalized it
at the last minute. But it remains illegal,
because it violates the Geneva Conventions and the Detainee Treatment Act.
 Not that any American prosecutor
would touch these cases with a ten-foot
pole. I mention the legalities only to put
the issue in perspective. Participating in
abusive interrogations not only offends
against a moral norm that before 9/11
we found uncontroversial. It is also illegal, and in some cases criminal.
 The ethical debates within the professions haven’t been about legality,
though. As we’ve seen, they are debates
over whether the torture professionals
have betrayed the core values of their
professions. Here, I have some doubts.
 Those who have said yes hold a particular view of the professions—the
view that I’ve labeled “Hippocratic,” in
a broad sense that doesn’t apply only
to health professionals. It’s a traditional
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view of professionalism as inseparably
combining two ingredients: mastery of a
technical subject, and use of knowledge
to serve broadly humane ends. In short:
expertise plus service. In the case of lawyers, it also includes respect for the law.
For the past two decades, we’ve become familiar with this view of what a
profession is in the endless debates over
whether “commercialism” has been undermining “professionalism” in professions like law and medicine. Advocates
of “professionalism” adhere to the Hippocratic vision of knowledge wedded
to service ‘til death do them part. They
rail against those who see no vice in forprofit activities that don’t necessarily
honor the service ideal. These debates
are often heartfelt, but it is fair to say that
they have not made much progress. One
reason, I think, is that those who hold
the Hippocratic view seem to assume
a dogmatic professional essentialism.
They proclaim that combining expertise
and service just is the core of the profession, and if you think otherwise you are
not a real professional.
 Now, as Arthur Applbaum has argued, there is a simple and fatal reply to
professional essentialism. It goes something like this: You say that if I practice
non-Hippocratic medicine I’m not a real
doctor? Very well, then! Don’t call me
a doctor—call me a “shmoctor”—what
Applbaum calls “a different practice
with different ends and different role
obligations.”55 Doctor, shmoctor. We
shmoctors know just as much about
medicine as you doctors. But we declare
that it’s fine to put that knowledge to
uses that you disapprove of—like assisting at interrogations.
In just the same way, if lawyers think
it’s a betrayal of professional ideals to
tailor legal opinions to client desires, call
them “shmawyers” and be done with it.
Shmychologists have no qualms about
teaching soldiers how to break detainees’ will, and shmanthropologists are
happy to sign contracts with the government to help devise counterinsurgency
tactics.
 Applbaum’s point is that there is
no essential core to what makes up a
profession’s ethos beyond the self-understanding and self-definition of the
professionals at any given time.56 If
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enough doctors come to see themselves
as shmoctors—in other words, if they
think that a shmoctor is a doctor—then,
as Applbaum says, “it will become so.”57
Many people today believe that HMO
practices like capitation have already
turned doctors into shmoctors, and large
law firms that nakedly pursue partnership shares above all else have turned
lawyers into shmawyers. The point of
Applbaum’s “doctor-shmoctor” argument is simply to dramatize that there
is no necessary connection between professional expertise and a Hippocratic vision of professional service.
For that reason, Applbaum rightly
suggests that professionals have to fight
for where they think their profession’s
soul lies. They won’t find the answer by
analyzing the concept of the profession.
In my opinion, professionals should
welcome vigorous debates like those
undertaken by the organizations of physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and
anthropologists. These are not merely
culture-wars over symbolic issues. They
are struggles for the soul of the professions.

Applbaum rightly suggests that
professionals have to fight for
where they think their
profession’s soul lies.

But matters can’t be limited to an
intraprofessional debate between doctors and shmoctors, psychologists and
shmychologists. The fact is that we
lay-people also have understandings
and expectations of how professionals
should operate. Applbaum appreciates
this when he writes that the physician’s
role “is stitched together from the shared
social meanings of those who profess to
be doctors and those who call upon their
services.”58 I would go even further than
Applbaum. The larger public—those
who are neither professionals nor directly use their specific services—also have
a say in defining the professional role.
 After all, the broader society awards
substantial perks to professionals based
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on our approbation of their roles. Some
of these perks take the form of legal privileges. Because we think it is in people’s
interests to be able to consult a doctor or
lawyer confidentially, we grant a valuable, enforceable attorney-client and
doctor-patient privilege to these professionals. If we thought that lawyers were
really shmawyers, abusing the privilege
by writing secret CYA opinions for their
clients, we would have no reason to allow the privilege to stay intact.
 There are other tangible perks as well.
We grant many professionals licenses
that enhance their incomes by limiting
the market. We allow professions to regulate themselves. We finance research
into medicine, psychology, and anthropology, and publicly underwrite loans
so that students can pursue their studies
in these fields. More intangibly, we reward these professionals with prestige,
respect, and in many cases trust.
 All of these are goods that we—the
larger social “we”—grant on a certain
understanding of what the professions
are. It is not at all clear that we would
grant the same goods and respect to
shmoctors, shmawyers, shmychologists,
and shmanthropologists.
 Of course, what “we” think about
torture can change too. In October 2005,
the Pew Foundation surveyed Americans, asking them “Do you think the
use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be justified, sometimes be
justified, rarely be justified, or never be
justified?” Only one out of three thought
that torture can never be justified, while
fifteen percent thought it can often be
justified.59
 That circles us back to the enormous
popularity of 24 and the distracting
pseudo-debate about ticking bombs
that I began with. Since 9/11, we have
become a country both frightened and
angry, and it should come as no surprise if frightened, angry publics develop an appetite for inflicting suffering
and humiliation on those they blame. It
wouldn’t be the first time. A Gallup poll
during World War II found that thirteen
percent of Americans wanted to kill all
Japanese.60
 Our current flirtation with Jack Bauer
stands in sharp contrast to the national
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commitment we undertook when the
U.S. Senate ratified the Convention
Against Torture two decades ago. One
article of the Torture Convention reads:
“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat
or war, internal political instability or
any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture.”61
We used to take that for granted, and it
remains a touted international commitment of the United States.
So we who aren’t in the professions
also need to do some soul searching.
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We need our own debate over who we
are and what we stand for. That debate
will determine whether we are willing
to support professions that permit their
members to participate in “outrages on
personal dignity.” Personally, I hope
that we are not willing to support them.
I would not like to see professionals engage in such activity without paying a
heavy price.
In the end, then, I’ve expressed doubt
that Hippocratic, anti-torture prohibitions belong to some kind of logic
internal to the professional expertise

itself. But I don’t disagree with the antitorture prohibitions. Instead, I’ve suggested that professionals who oppose
participation in torture and cruelty need
to fight for the souls of their profession
on fundamental grounds: not that torture and cruelty violate the logic of the
profession, but that torture and cruelty
are repugnant. And the rest of us need
to carry on the same argument. We need
to turn off the TV and start thinking and
talking.
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